Stanley McChrystal Tells Troops Speak Your Mind Not Mine

This should be required watching. Stanley McChrystal addresses the troops (and the "enemy") after Obama's speech:

Brooks on Karzai's Organized Crime Ring

First, I have to say that I loathe Hamid Karzai. How dare he run a corrupt government and then expect the U.S. to preserve his status. He needs to step up and take care of his people and his country. Not likely though. Conservative columnist David Brooks offers his insights on why Obama moved away from the COIN (counterinsurgency) strategy to come up with another:

First, they say, COIN is phenomenally expensive. It consists of doing a lot of things at once — from increasing troop levels to nation-building — and doing them over a long period of time. America no longer has that kind of money, and Americans won’t accept a new 10-year commitment having already been there for eight.

Second, it may be possible to clear and hold territory, but it is looking less likely that we will be able to transfer it to any legitimate Afghan authority. The Karzai government is like an organized crime ring. The governing talent is thin. Plans to build a 400,000-man Afghan security force are unrealistic.

Third, they continue, the population in Afghanistan is too dispersed for COIN to work properly. There would be a few bubbles of security, where allied troops are massed, but then vast sanctuaries for the insurgents.

Fourth, COIN is too Afghan-centric and not enough Pakistan-centric. The real threats to U.S. interests are along the Afghan-Pakistani border or involve the destabilization of the Pakistani government. The COIN approach does little to directly address that. Read it all at NYT

Obama Wants Details on Afghanistan Exit Strategy

As NPR's Mary Louise Kelly reports, the president " is pushing his national security team for more detail about an exit strategy for U.S. forces fighting in Afghanistan." Administration officials tell her that during a 2 1/2 meeting yesterday with his top advisers, the president "pushed his team for more detail about an exit strategy for U.S. forces. They said he wants to make clear to the Afghan government that the U.S. commitment is not open-ended." NPR

John Dickerson revives the "dithering" comment or shall we call it "dickering" after Dick Cheney. This is probably the first time the military leadership hasn't had a blank check from the American people to do whatever they want.
Invade a country? Sure, here's a few billion. No exit strategy? That's okay. We'll just tell the American people you can't put a timetable on these things.
Colin Powell has advised Obama to take his time, to ignore politics of the left and right, and get this decision right.

The four troop options:

-- "The low option": Adding 10,000 troops, all of them to train Afghan forces.

-- "The hybrid": 15,000 to 20,000 additional troops who would focus on counterterrorism.

-- The mix of 35,000 Americans and about 5,000 from NATO forces.

-- An increase of 40,000; all of them Americans. NPR

Obama Considering a Counterterrorism Counterinsurgency Blend

Obama at the Naval Air Station Jacksonville

The Washington Post expects Obama to announce his decision around Nov. 20. I know he's intent on not rushing, but I'm thinking the announcement will come before that, despite Obama's travels to Asia starting Nov. 11:

President Obama has asked the Pentagon's top generals to provide him with more options for troop levels in Afghanistan, two U.S. officials said late Friday, with one adding that some of the alternatives would allow Obama to send fewer new troops than the roughly 40,000 requested by his top commander.

Obama met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the White House on Friday, holding a 90-minute discussion that centered on the strain on the force after eight years of war in two countries. The meeting -- the first of its kind with the chiefs of the Navy, Army, Marine Corps and Air Force, who were not part of the president's war council meetings on Afghanistan in recent weeks -- prompted Obama to request another such meeting before he announces a decision on sending additional troops, the officials said. WaPo

Counterinsurgency (John McCain's preference) or counterterrorism (Biden's recommendation)?

Obama is expected to receive several options from the Pentagon about troop levels next week, according to the two officials, who discussed the deliberations on the condition of anonymity because they are not authorized to speak publicly.

Before he can determine troop levels, his advisers have said, he must decide whether to embrace a strategy focused heavily on counterinsurgency, which would require additional forces to protect population centers, or one that makes counterterrorism the main focus of U.S. efforts in the country, which would rely on relatively fewer American troops.

One option under review involves a blend of the two approaches, featuring an emphasis on counterterrorism in the north and some parts of western Afghanistan as well as an expanded counterinsurgency effort in the south and east, one of the officials said. Obama has also asked for a province-by-province review of the country to determine which areas can by managed effectively by local leaders.

The president appears committed to adding at least 10,000 to 15,000 troops in Afghanistan in an effort to bolster the training of Afghan army and police officers in the country. Current plans call for the United States to double the size of the Afghan army and police forces to about 400,000 in the hope that they can take over security responsibilities. WaPo

Kerry Speaks From Afghanistan

Kerry says Obama can't make a decision about forces without an Afghanistan government in place. That seems like a no-brainer to me.

But after 8 years of a languishing Afghanistan, why in the world, if not for politics, are the republicans telling Obama to hurry up? It was Bush who decided Afghanistan was well enough for us to move all of our resources to Iraq. It strikes me as very odd that the moment that Obama decides that it's time to think seriously about Afghanistan and the region the republicans decide it's time to load up more troops.

I suppose it's a knee-jerk reaction to Gen. Stanley McChrystal's report, calling for more troops. Republicans are led by the military instead of leading the military. I'm certain that given all the deliberations the Obama administration is doing for the region, we're going to be far better off with the decision.

Counting the number of troops isn't going to determine success in Afghanistan, Kerry says.

The Mighty Joe Biden

In the beginning, many people questioned Joe Biden's value as vice president.
They laughed and joked, calling Biden the gaffe maker. He took it well and, indeed, made a few gaffes. For a while, Joe seemed to be defending his job as a confidant and advice giver.
But Joe has proven to be a worthy veep.
He works behind the scenes with barely any media coverage. He's the good version of Cheney. Instead of moving behind the scenes figuring out how to torture people, Joe does good stuff and goes on important trips. He's been all over the globe and he's been all over the nation announcing stimulus funds, comforting people in his way and schmoozing with the firemen, police officers and union people. Above all, Joe is a good man.
And if Obama chooses Biden's strategy for Afghanistan-Pakistan, it will say a lot about Biden's unrecognized might and the bond between Obama and Biden.
Newsweek says, as other media have said in the past, that Joe is valued less for his advice and more for his ability to stir things up (I'd argue that's Joe's approach to influencing the conversation):

Across the board, Biden's real value to the president is not really his specific advice. It's his ability to stir things up. Senior government officials who have participated in small meetings with the president and vice president have noticed Obama and Biden engaged in a duet. "The president will lean over, and they will quietly talk to each other. Biden will then question someone, make comments, and the president just leans back and seems to be taking it all in before he speaks," Attorney General Eric Holder tells NEWSWEEK. Ron Klain, Biden's chief of staff, describes the interaction like this: "President Obama is one of the world's greatest listeners; you can't tell what he is thinking. He's able to watch the VP ask tough questions and doesn't have to do that himself. [In that way] he doesn't have to reveal what he's thinking. That's very valuable." Newsweek

Newsweek leads with this example:

Joe Biden had a question. During a long Sunday meeting with President Obama and top national-security advisers on Sept. 13, the VP interjected, "Can I just clarify a factual point? How much will we spend this year on Afghanistan?" Someone provided the figure: $65 billion. "And how much will we spend on Pakistan?" Another figure was supplied: $2.25 billion. "Well, by my calculations that's a 30-to-1 ratio in favor of Afghanistan. So I have a question. Al Qaeda is almost all in Pakistan, and Pakistan has nuclear weapons. And yet for every dollar we're spending in Pakistan, we're spending $30 in Afghanistan. Does that make strategic sense?" The White House Situation Room fell silent. But the questions had their desired effect: those gathered began putting more thought into Pakistan as the key theater in the region.

Newsweek might call that stirring the pot but Biden has been long advocating a Pakistan strategy:

The four part plan he laid out included large, unconditional financial support for non-security projects such as schools, roads, clinics, etc; conditioning of security aid on performance; support for judicial, political, and good government reforms; and finally and increase in public diplomacy and high impact support.

Sen. Biden first correctly linked the current instability to the administration's poor management and near desertion of Afghanistan by early 2002. He downplayed the notion that the rise of terrorism resulted from the absence of a fully functioning liberal democracy in Pakistan, instead arguing that Musharraf saw the U.S. packing up its bags in Afghanistan soon after the invasion (in preparation for Iraq) and responded by hedging against the U.S. departure and cutting other "Faustian bargains." Pakistan had experience being burned by the U.S. in the past. They were left holding the bag and contending with unmanageable militants when the U.S. -- after partnering with Pakistan to foster and back the mujahedeen in the late 80s to counter the Soviet threat -- promptly departed.

A second assessment the senator made concerned the failure of the U.S. to extend engagement to the Pakistani moderate majority. While Musharraf is conveniently being treated as the fall guy who snuffed out democracy in his country, it's important to remember that the U.S. abetted this trend by raising expectations by declaring democracy was on the march and then failing to broaden its engagement in Pakistan and Afghanistan (as they both shared the territory that formed the hotbed of terrorism). This was a result of our policy to deal with al Qaeda on the cheap -- to simply fund the Pakistani military to kill terrorists rather than invest in altering the structures that gave rise to terrorism. A Musharraf policy rather than a Pakistan policy derived from limited U.S. interest and attention span. WN

Newsweek also notes that Biden is incorrectly labeled a "dove:"

Biden has been incorrectly characterized as a dove who wants to pull out of Afghanistan. In fact, according to his "Counterterrorism-Plus" paper, he wants to maintain a large troop presence. He also favors a greater emphasis on training Afghan troops—and defending Kabul and Kandahar—than on chasing the Taliban around the countryside, and he wants more diplomatic efforts to try to peel away those Taliban who can be bought with money or other inducements (like political power). He is leery of massive attempts at nation building and more hopeful that the United States can work with local warlords than with the corrupt and inept central government in Kabul. On a grander strategic level, he wants to tilt the administration's efforts more toward Pakistan (to "make the problem PakAf, not AfPak"), reasoning that Al Qaeda—the real threat to the United States—is hiding out not in Afghanistan but in nuclear-armed -Pakistan. Read the whole Newsweek story here

Bacevich Advocates a Cold War For Afghanistan

This plan, an alternative to all-out or all-in, sounds like the best plan yet:

The counterinsurgency campaign proposed in Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal's strategic assessment will prolong the war for an additional five or 10 years. The war's most ardent proponents insist that President Obama has no choice: It's either fight on or invite another 9/11.

Fortunately, there is an alternative to a global counterinsurgency campaign. Instead of fighting an endless hot war in a vain effort to eliminate the jihadist threat, the United States should wage a cold war to keep the threat at bay. Such a strategy worked before. It can work again.

At the dawn of what the Bush administration came to call the Long War, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld told U.S. military personnel: "We have two choices. Either we change the way we live, or we must change the way they live. We choose the latter." In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the work of changing the way they live has turned out to be difficult, costly and problematic. After years of exertions, $1 trillion expended and more than 5,000 American troops lost, U.S. forces have yet to win a decisive victory. The high-tech American way of war developed during the 1990s (once celebrated in phrases such as "shock and awe" and "speed kills") stands thoroughly discredited.

Changing the way they live -- where "they" are the people of the Islamic world -- qualifies as mission impossible. The Long War is a losing proposition; it will break the bank and break the force.

Bacevich hits the nail on the head. We can't change the way they live. Only they can change the way they live. The Cold approach:

As during the Cold War, a strategy of containment should include comprehensive export controls and the monitoring of international financial transactions. Without money and access to weapons, the jihadist threat shrinks to insignificance: All that remains is hatred. Ideally, this approach should include strenuous efforts to reduce the West's dependence on Middle Eastern oil, which serves to funnel many billions of dollars into the hands of people who may not wish us well.

During the Cold War, containment did not preclude engagement, and it shouldn't today. To the extent that the United States can encourage liberalizing tendencies in the Islamic world, it should do so -- albeit with modest expectations. Sending jazz musicians deep into the Eastern Bloc in the old days was commendable, but Louis Armstrong's trumpet didn't topple the Soviet empire.

Finally, there is the matter of competition. Again, the Cold War offers an instructive analogy. During the long twilight struggle with the Soviets, competition centered on demonstrating scientific superiority (putting a man on the moon) and material superiority (providing cars, refrigerators and TVs for the masses). The West won. Read it all at WaPo

Gates to Revamp Defense Department

UPDATE 4-6: Watch Gates defense budget announcement here.

WaPo: Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates is expected to announce on Monday the restructuring of several dozen major defense programs as part of the Obama administration's bid to shift military spending from preparations for large-scale war against traditional rivals to the counterinsurgency programs that Gates and others consider likely to dominate U.S. conflicts in coming decades.

Gates's aides say his plan would boost spending for some programs and take large whacks at others, including some with powerful constituencies on Capitol Hill and among influential contractors, making his announcement more of an opening bid than a decisive end to weeks of sometimes acrimonious internal Pentagon debate.

Among the programs expected to be heavily cut is the Army's Future Combat Systems, a network of vehicles linked by high-tech communications that has been plagued by technical troubles and delays; with a price tag exceeding $150 billion, it is now one of the most costly military efforts.

There is debate within the military whether counterinsurgency --using minimal force and focusing narrowly on insurgents while helping the locals with their economy and other aspects --is weakening the military.
Counterinsurgency, favored by Petraeus, attempts to get the locals to reject the insurgents. It limits civilian deaths.
Some prefer the old fashioned bomb and shoot them up way -- civilians and all.
Listen to Gen. David Petraeus lay out the Afghanistan plan here.